Policy Paper

Renewing Public Ownership: *Constructing a Democratic Economy in the Twenty-First Century*

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Policy Series

In the public interest: the role of the modern state

All societies across the world have some kind of state - the question is not whether the state should play a role in society, but what sort of role that should be. Neoliberalism, the dominant political orthodoxy since the 1980s, views the state as primarily the defender of national sovereignty, protector of private property, and maintainer of social order. Under neoliberalism there is no role for the state in promoting sustainability, social justice or technological progress. Initially the financial crisis of 2008 seemed also to be a crisis of neoliberal thinking, but the implications of neoliberal failure upon the role of the state were never seriously debated.

Too often, the left has succumbed to the ‘small state’ arguments of neoliberalism without considering rationally the appropriate role and place of the state in a 21st century economy and society confronted with major problems. Five years after the financial crisis, and with an ecological crisis looming, it is time to ask how a modern state can play a major role in securing social and ecological justice in the UK. This paper was commissioned as part of a series that will seek to address these issues and creatively explore the role of the modern state. Contributions will address options for new decentralised and local models; new forms of ownership and governance; as well as high-level interventions on how to increase investment and end out-sourcing and profiteering in our public services.

Author

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Executive summary

Since 1979 the privatisation and marketization policies of successive governments have delivered the economy into the hands of a narrow set of vested corporate and financial interests. The consequences are that decision-making is geared towards short-term profit and rent-seeking, at the expense of more longer-term thinking and in particular strategic concerns for the common good.

Privatisation has also been accompanied by a growing foreign ownership of the UK’s most strategically important resources and assets, raising important questions about government’s ability to control and administer important public policy objectives such as tackling climate change and providing essential services to the public at the lowest cost.

In response, this report argues that the UK needs to rethink its approach to ownership and control of the economy, developing more democratic institutions and structures that re-distribute economic decision-making power beyond its capture by financial, corporate and foreign interests.

In particular we need to create new forms of public and collective ownership that are better able to develop an economy to serve social needs and environmental concerns over private gain. Such forms of ownership should combine higher level strategic coordination with more localised forms of public ownership. In all cases, though, ownership should seek to enhance democratic accountability and public engagement in the economy.

The failures of privatisation in other countries are producing a growing trend to take back utility sectors into public ownership. A range of new and hybrid forms of public ownership are detailed in this report that offer solutions for dealing with the UK’s growing democratic deficit in the economy.

The report also counters some of the widespread myths and caricatures of past forms of nationalisation in the UK to stress the under-reported effectiveness of many forms of public ownership at delivering public goals, in contrast to the experience with privatisation.
Introduction

In early 2008 at the height of the financial crisis, public ownership came back to the forefront of public attention when the UK government nationalised three of the UK’s largest high street banks, Northern Rock, HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland. At the height of the crisis, the enormous sum of £1.162 trillion of public money had been committed to provide loans, share purchases and guarantees to the banking sector¹. The last time a major nationalisation programme had been carried out by a UK government was in the 1970s when another reluctant Labour government nationalised certain ailing manufacturing industries. In the intervening three decades, both Conservative and Labour governments had rejected public ownership as a policy that belonged firmly in the past.

The resurrection of public ownership was not intended to change the underlying fundamentals of how the economy was run. As Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was keen to stress at the time:

It is better for the Government to hold on to Northern Rock for a temporary period and as and when market conditions improve the value of Northern Rock will grow and therefore the taxpayer will gain. The long-term ownership of this bank must lie in the private sector.²

Like most of the British political establishment, Darling remained committed to the view that banking, like the rest of the economy, should remain in private hands and that it was not the job of the government or the public sector to engage in economic decision-making. Public ownership was an emergency and temporary measure before the banks could be returned to ‘business as usual’. At no point during these nationalisations, or in the subsequent attempts at reform³ were more fundamental questions asked about how the financial sector, and indeed the economy as a whole, was being run and in whose interests.

As part of an agenda to take back the economy from private vested interests, this paper sets out the case for revitalising public ownership as a long-term strategic policy solution rather than a short-term palliative for dealing with ‘market failure’. As such, the argument advanced here is part of a wider acknowledgement of the continued importance of state-led investment and collective action for advancing

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critical public policy goals⁴. Three decades of privatisation and marketization in the UK have not only increased social inequality but have also resulted in economic decision-making being captured and concentrated in fewer hands. The opening up of vast swathes of the public sector and formerly nationalised industries to private capital have created a situation in which the UK is shifting towards a ‘rentier’ economy, dominated by financial interests and shareholder value. This has created increased uncertainty and instability but it also means that the economy is increasingly working for private vested interests rather than any broader conception of the common good. In particular, this has meant that the UK is failing in terms of undertaking the necessary investment, productivity improvements and the shift towards a greener economy essential for longer-term shared prosperity and stability. To rectify this, we need to rethink our approach to issues of ownership and control. A critical element of this will be to develop new forms of public ownership that are both democratically accountable, but also encourage broader engagement and participation in economic life by the wider public. Drawing upon experience from other countries, this report sets out the variety of ways in which public and collective ownership can be introduced to meet the critical social and environmental issues that face us all in the twenty-first century.
Privatisation and the growing concentration of economic ownership

Since 1979, successive governments have pursued a strategy around the marketization and privatisation of the economy. Beginning with Conservative governments in the 1980s, but continuing under Labour and the current Coalition government, more and more areas of economic and social life have been transferred to private ownership. Nowadays, it is usually forgotten that one of the original stated aims of privatisation was to create a property owning democracy where millions of ordinary people would have the opportunity to buy the shares of privatised companies. The problem with this approach was that the democracy created was rather superficial; of course small investors can go along to board meetings and vote as shareholders, but shareholdings are still dominated by larger private and corporate investors.

In fact, the historical data shows that the privatisation process has actually reinforced the concentration of ownership in the economy over the long-term (Figure 1). The majority of individuals who buy shares in privatisation cash these in relatively quickly⁵. Share ownership by individuals has plummeted massively from 53 per cent of the total in 1963 to just over 10 per cent in 2012. The ownership trend in the privatised utilities has been in line with the broader trend in the rest of the economy with a massive growth in foreign and corporate ownership since the 1980s in particular.

The exposure of privatised firms to internationalization and foreign investment has not produced highly competitive sectors with a plethora of firms offering customer choice, but a growing concentration of ownership, facilitated by merger and acquisition activity; what one set of commentators refer to as "commercial imperatives [having] re-integrated markets" (Hall et al. 2003: 26). In the UK’s energy sector for example, the leading four companies (Npower, EDF, Eon and SSE) account for 96 per cent of the residential electricity generating market and 71 per cent of total generating capacity (Rutledge 2012).
A particular irony has been the growth of foreign state-owned corporations in the UK’s privatised utilities. In the energy sector, foreign state-owned corporations account for 25 per cent of the sector but 68 per cent of nuclear power and 50 per cent of offshore wind energy projects⁶. This leads to perverse public policy outcomes. In this case, it could be argued that Chinese, French, Norwegian and Russian governments – through their state-owned corporations – have collectively far more control over UK strategic energy interests than any British political actor.

Another important aspect to this story has been the growth of financial interests, such as private equity firms and hedge funds in the ownership of basic utilities. The water sector is a good illustration of these trends. An analysis carried out in 2010 showed that ten of the twenty-three local and regional water companies in England and Wales were under direct foreign ownership with a further eight owned by private equity groups including considerable foreign involvement (Hall and Lobina 2010).

Another pertinent example comes from the UK’s electricity distribution network, which has a significant amount of both foreign and financial interests involved in its ownership (see Table 1). Given that these companies effectively operate as natural monopolies they can make vast profits. According to one source, these
Companies have average pre-tax profit margins of around 30 per cent and have been allowed to impose year-on-year price rises of about 5 per cent (well above inflation) by the energy regulator OFGEM up until 2015⁷.

Table 1: Ownership of the regional electricity distributor companies 2011–2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Electric</td>
<td>SSE</td>
<td>Southern England (greater Hampshire area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Hydro</td>
<td>SSE</td>
<td>North Scotland (north of central belt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP Energy Networks</td>
<td>Iberdrola</td>
<td>South Scotland (including Edinburgh &amp; Glasgow) North West England</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish owned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity North West</td>
<td>North West Electricity Networks</td>
<td>North West England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jersey registered company advised by JP Morgan &amp; Global Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Power Grid</td>
<td>North Electric</td>
<td>North East of England and Yorkshire area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• North Electric</td>
<td>• Yorkshire Electricity</td>
<td>MAEH is a holding company controlled by Berkshire Hathaway associated with Warren Buffett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Power Networks</td>
<td>Hong Kong based consortium</td>
<td>London, South East England and East Anglia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EDF brought 3 networks together and sold on for £5.5 billion in 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Power</td>
<td>PPL</td>
<td>South West England, South Wales, East Midlands, West Midlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US (Pennsylvania) private energy company</td>
</tr>
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[Source: Cumbers et al 2013]
The importance of ownership, control and democratic decision-making

Why does ownership matter and why is public ownership important? During the 1990s and 2000s, many politicians on the left dropped public ownership as a policy option and embraced privatisation. It was argued that in the context of a more open global economy, direct government policy intervention was futile and likely to scare off foreign investors whilst driving domestic companies to relocate. It is worth saying that there has never been any convincing empirical evidence to support either of these propositions, but plenty of examples of the continued role of state intervention in the most successful economies⁸. Nevertheless, government policy across the advanced economies of Europe and North America shifted from direct intervention in, and planning of, the economy, to facilitating supportive economic environments for business (through lowering taxation and deregulation) and encouraging private enterprise and ownership.

Even many of those social democratic and socialist politicians still committed to equality and social justice as important political principles have dropped policies of public ownership from their agendas. They have tended to prioritise distributional justice – redistributing income through taxation and other policies – over ownership and control of the economy per se. From this perspective, ownership of the economy can be left to private firms as long as governments can undertake policies, which can tax and spend the profits of companies for the wider public good.

However, the experience of privatisation over the past three decades provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Not only do policies of privatisation and market deregulation serve to reinforce inequalities, but they also leave the main strategic levers of the economy in the hands of a narrow set of private interests. Decision-making and basic priority setting – about how an economy is organised and what is produced – will be dictated by these vested interests rather than the common good or any sense of wider public policy goals. Under such circumstances, when governments want to embark upon key policies, such as tackling climate change, dealing with acute housing shortages or building new infrastructure such as schools or hospitals, they have to provide enormous financial incentives for companies to
invest; the 1997 Labour Government’s Private Finance Initiative and its many pitfalls, being the most pertinent example here⁹.

A very good example of how this works can be found in the UK’s energy sector where key public policy goals are supposedly about delivering cheap and affordable energy to consumers, providing security of supply, and shifting away from carbon fuels towards renewable energy as part of tackling global warming. However, under the privatised regime that currently exists, the UK is monumentally failing on all three counts.

Taking the affordability issue first, the most recent figures for domestic electricity prices show that despite its wealth of natural energy resources, the UK has the fourth highest prices in the European Union 15 group (excluding new East and Central European accession states) (DECC 2013, 56). Other studies over a number of years have consistently concluded that electricity prices are between 10 and 20 per cent higher than they would have been without privatisation (Hall et al 2009). Juxtaposed against this, the UK has some of the worst statistics in Europe for fuel poverty¹⁰. Particularly shocking are the number of pensioners who die from extreme cold every winter with rates for the UK as a whole double that of Finland, with its much colder winter climate, and far higher also than countries with similarly severe winter weather such as Sweden and Germany (ibid).

The UK also has one of the worst records in Europe in shifting its energy production towards renewables with a figure of just under 4 per cent of energy consumption from renewables, which is about one third of the EU average¹¹. Linked to this is the energy security issue; the UK’s current carbon-based and nuclear energy power stations are coming to the end of their lives. With about one quarter of the existing power station capacity due to be closed by 2025, it has been estimated that at least £110 billion infrastructure investment is required to achieve both security of supply and the UK’s environmental objectives of meeting 30 per cent of its electricity generation from renewables by 2020 (DECC 2013).

Moreover, in order to achieve an 80 per cent reduction of 1990 level greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (the stated policy goal), very much more will be required than even these amounts. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (March 2011) has estimated a range between £200 billion and £1 trillion will be
required over the next 10 to 20 years. Given the low level of national ownership and also skill levels (Rutledge 2012), the UK is completely dependent on foreign (and as we noted above) often state owned companies to deliver this vast investment.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that the privatised system is failing to deliver on the most basic of energy policy goals — ‘keeping the lights on’ — with massive implications for the UK’s strategic energy requirements (e.g. Bradshaw 2012). Under privatisation large established power utilities have had little incentive to switch from conventional sources of power, such as existing oil, gas, coal and nuclear power stations, towards renewables, because they can make vast profits from the status quo, whereas they would have to make very significant investments to put in place the infrastructure necessary for renewables.

Rectifying this situation, while continuing with the current regime means that governments will have to set huge incentives, including the restructuring of ‘markets’ to create the level of return that will attract foreign investors. One of the perverse effects has been the growth of renewable-related subsidies for foreign state-owned corporations. As Rutledge reports, the Danish state energy company, DONG, and the Swedish government owned Vattenfall, were the largest beneficiaries of UK government subsidies in 2011 with £156 million and £128 million respectively in wind farm subsidies (Rutledge 2012). This also has considerable implications for further increases in electricity prices to consumers, which are at present already 20 per cent higher in real terms than they were in 2007 (DECC 2013, 12).

The experience in the energy sector is mirrored elsewhere, where privatisation has not brought the promised investment or efficiency gains but instead led to regimes of private value extraction at the expense of the public purse, while leaving a legacy of decaying infrastructure. For example, Bowman et al’s forensic analysis of the effects of rail privatisation come to the scathing conclusion that “Rail privatisation created a situation whereby risk and investment averse private companies positioned themselves as value extractors, thanks to high public subsidies” (Bowman et al 2013, 14). While public subsidy has increased rather than contracted following privatisation, investment has slumped dramatically. To provide one example, investment in rolling stock in the five years prior to rail privatisation was over 60 per cent higher than in the five-year period to 2012 (ibid, 43).
There are two critical points that come out of this analysis for broader issues of ownership and control. The first is that under privatised regimes, there is a direct conflict between the profit-making concerns of business and important public policy goals. Left in private hands, decision-making and investment will deliver for short-term shareholder value, more often than not at the expense of workers and customers. The second is that to square this circle, governments have to provide massive and perverse subsidies and incentives to encourage private investment, particularly where long-term investment in infrastructure is required. Faced with these massive contradictions, the need for public ownership and strategic direction in key sectors of the economy becomes a matter of great urgency.
Myths and realities about public ownership in the past and present

In recent years a very effective public policy discourse about the defects of public ownership has been articulated by proponents of privatisation. This runs as follows. The old nationalised industries were bloated, over-centralised state bureaucracies, run by civil servants and political appointees who were not only far removed from the demands and requirements of the ordinary customer or passenger, but lacked the right commercial skills and expertise to run these services. A good dose of privatisation, commercial expertise and injection of private finance would help to rejuvenate these sectors and the introduction of market forces and competition would make them more responsive to customer needs and encourage innovation. Public ownership as a policy option therefore carries a lot of baggage, despite the failings of privatisation.

Prior to 1979, both Labour and Conservative governments carried out forms of nationalisation but these were neither as radically socialist as is often claimed by their detractors, nor at all democratic in shifting the economy towards more collective decision-making and away from vested interests. The greatest phase of nationalisation – by the Atlee Labour Government between 1945 and 1951 – involved over two million workers and included the coal industry, iron and steel industries, Bank of England, the civil aviation industry, the railways, and public utilities such as electricity, water and gas.

The main motivation behind this programme was to make the British capitalist economy more competitive following years of poor productivity and a lack of investment by private owners. Very little radical change in the organisation of these industries occurred. Both Labour and Conservative governments made a virtue of the fact that these industries were to be run on a commercial basis, at arms-length from government. At the same time, they were not given the commercial freedom of private companies, prevented from borrowing money in the financial markets to fund investment on the one hand, while also barred from setting their own prices on the other.
Despite all this, the record of the nationalised industries was far better than is commonly portrayed, especially compared to the subsequent experience of privatisation. Some industries, notably coal and steel, car and shipbuilding industries had suffered from years of underinvestment at the hands of private owners — one of the main motivating factors behind nationalisation in the first place. These were subsequently cast as “lame duck” industries when they experienced severe decline during the recession of the late 1970s and 1980s and many other nationalised sectors tarred with the same brush by Conservative and pro-business interests.

However, many of the utility sectors that were privatised, notably telecommunications and gas, were relatively well-run public entities that operated at a profit to the public purse. A detailed study by Sawyer and O’Donnell found that total factor productivity (which includes the productivity performance of labour and capital) in the nationalised industries of gas, electricity and water increased by 3.1 per cent between 1950 and 1985, a figure that was higher than both their US privately owned counterparts (2.6 per cent) and UK manufacturing as a whole (1.8 per cent) over the same period. Even British Rail, which was starved of serious investment and modernisation by parsimonious governments right through the 1945 – 79 period, was, by the mid-1980s “delivering exemplary operating efficiency” (Bowman et al 2013, 135), that was better than its European counterparts. With regard to the comparative experience before and after privatisation, Sawyer and O’Donnell found that at best “privatisation has produced mixed results. Where there have been noticeable efficiency gains, these have tended to occur mainly in the run-up to privatisation, where the industries were rationalised and prepared for sale, suggesting one-off efficiency gains” (ibid.: 27).

There were two main weaknesses of nationalisations before 1979. The first related to their effectiveness; they were seen as part of government spending and therefore always starved of investment compared to their continental comparators. The other main weakness was the failure to inject anything approaching a more democratic form of organisation into the economy, stopping short even of the concept of elected worker directors that subsequently developed in West Germany and the Nordic countries. Instead, ministers preferred the model of the large public corporation along the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) — at arms’ length from government control — but at the same time providing no effective voice for either workers or consumers (Saville 1993). Despite union opposition and protests, time and again the government bowed to the interests of establishment...
civil servants, managers, and private business in excluding worker representatives from the new corporations’ boards.

Many of the nationalised industries were effectively left in the hands of the same political and business classes that had run the industries before nationalisation. The starkest example was in the coal industry where Lord Hyndley – the managing director of one of the largest private mining companies, Powell Duffryn – was appointed as its first chairman. Across the nationalised industries national and regional officials were also appointed from the ranks of private industry or in many cases from the military (Fishman 1993). This was a very peculiar British form of nationalisation and very much at odds with the parallel process in France where, in their initial structures, nationalised industries had a much greater commitment to the participation of diverse interest groups¹⁵.

In contrast, in the UK the lack of worker and broader citizen involvement in economic decision-making created a significant democratic deficit in industries that were now owned and managed supposedly on behalf of the people. Crucially this meant that in far too many areas of economic life, major decisions were taken with massive long-term consequences for the country as a whole, with hardly any public consultation or democratic involvement. The most pertinent examples were in the nationalised utility sectors where many activities that had previously been under local or municipal government control were removed and centralised in London around an elite of civil servants and public sector managers, often heavily influenced by financial and private sector interests¹⁶. A London metropolitan bias tended to predominate over local and regional interests under these circumstances.

Not only did this eviscerate important traditions of municipal socialism and more democratic forms of public ownership, but it also led to an increasing number of costly and unaccountable decisions (notably the decision to invest in nuclear power) by nationalised entities. Strategic decisions regarding the country’s economic interests were made without even a semblance of public debate and reflected the capture by particular fractions of the political elite:

> The lack of democratic controls meant little public, municipal or even parliamentary scrutiny of the activity of corporations; the colossal expenditures on the Magnox and AGR nuclear reactor systems were pushed through with virtually no proper debate with military considerations in mind. (Saville 1993: 57)
The same tendencies in organisation and management structure have persisted into the present under recent bank nationalisations with government insisting that commercial logics should remain the order of the day. A return to profitability at all costs and business as usual has been the leitmotif of both Labour and now Coalition governments, despite the opportunities presented to radically rethink the purpose and remit of the financial sector in ways that might produce more socially useful and productive institutions for the greater good. The new appointees to the nationalised companies were drawn from the same commercial banking cartel that had brought about the financial crisis in the first place (Brummer 2009).

One of the curious aspects of this continued commitment to the commercial and private expertise of managers and business leaders is that it is often at odds with the kinds of specialist knowledge and experience that are required to run particular sectors and industries. An obvious example comes from the recent experience with renationalisation of parts of the rail network. When the failed infrastructure company Railtrack was replaced by the publicly owned Network Rail, both the chief executive (construction) and the chairman (rocket scientist) were outsiders to the industry with no knowledge of the complex realities of running a national rail network. Ironically, one of the reasons for the trade unions’ continued strength in the rail industry is that their members have deeply rooted practical knowledge and experience of working and operating in the railways which has given them a considerable advantage over private managers coming into the industry from outside (Cumbers et al 2010).
The view from elsewhere: the resurrection of public ownership overseas

The continued British fixation with private management and ownership is increasingly out of step with much of the rest of the world, where similar experiences of the deficiencies of privatisation has generated a backlash among the public and politicians. The result has been an interesting movement towards new forms of public ownership that attempt both to improve public services while stimulating wider public participation and democratic decision-making.

A particularly significant development has been the growing global trend to remunicipalise water services with 86 cities worldwide so far taking water service contracts back into public ownership since 2000 (Lobina and Hall 2013) including many major cities in the US (e.g. Atlanta, Houston, Indianapolis) and Europe (e.g. Berlin, Paris, Bordeaux, Toulouse). The trend spans the global north and south, including cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the latter, an important innovation to emerge has been the growth of new forms of public ownership that provide multi-stakeholder governance and decision-making. A good example was the setting up of a new public corporation, Aguas Bonaerense SA in the Greater Buenos Aires region of Argentina in response to the failed privatisation by a US led consortium of multinational corporations. The new organisation was a specially created cooperative with shares held jointly by the local authority and the water and sanitation workers trade union. In another example, the Peruvian city of Huancayo created a trans-local public-public partnership (PUP) with an Argentinian municipal water company to share staff, knowledge and best practice in management water and sanitations systems.¹⁷

In Germany, the experience of energy privatisation has been similar to that of the UK with four large utilities dominating national power supplies with the result that prices remain high. As one local politician recently put it:

> Today, energy supply is characterised by oligopolies of private energy suppliers. There is practically no competition on price. The transition to renewable energies is made rather reluctantly and only as a consequence of massive state subsidies and regulatory requirements.¹⁸

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As a result, a growing number of cities and regions across the country are attempting to take the energy sector back into public hands. Two of the largest German states, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Baden-Württemberg have recently bought back energy generating companies from privatised entities¹⁹. Elsewhere, local and municipal governments are attempting to circumvent the privatised utilities by investing in their own power sources to meet renewable energy targets, recognising that public ownership is necessary to achieve the long-term planning required. To quote from one case:

The example of Munich shows how the transition process can be sped up if a city owns a utility company. By 2025, our utility company aims to produce so much green energy, that the entire demand of the city can be met. That requires enormous investments – around 9 billion euros by 2025 – and can only be successful if the long-term goal is sustainable economic success rather than short-term profit maximisation. (Reiter 2011)

As many politicians at local and national levels are discovering, the long-term commitments needed to move towards post-carbon energy systems needs public investment and strategic planning. Indeed, the EU Commissioner for Energy has now advocated the nationalisation of transmission networks across the European Union as a way of speeding up modernisation of grids and the development of a pan-European super-connector grid (Lobina and Hall 2013).

Across Germany, 44 new municipal companies (Stadtwerke) have been set up and over 100 energy concessions have returned to public hands since 2007 (ibid). The re-emergence of municipal public ownership of energy in Germany has also been accompanied by the establishment of new collaborative and partnership networks between cities and regions to promote public energy policies, share common services and provide knowledge and information exchange over energy matters. Two in particular, are worthy of note here. The first is the VKU (Verband kommunaler Unternehmen - the Association of Municipal Corporations), with over 1400 members. The VKU has a core statement that prioritises the importance of citizen needs and community interests over private commercial objectives while also insisting on local democratic self-administration.

A second network (Trianel) was formed in 1999 and is a venture between 80 stadtwerke to strengthen the role of municipal enterprises in purchasing electricity
in the liberalised EU energy market and in developing their own sources of power. Trianel has expanded its operations to build its own pumped storage power stations in conventional forms of energy as well as investing £800 million in its own offshore wind project off the island of Borkum in the North Sea. It has also expanded its geographical membership to include municipalities in Switzerland, Austria, and Netherlands. A key priority is the expansion of renewables in electricity production with a target for the network of 80 per cent by 2050 and the reduction of electricity consumption by 25 per cent, and primary energy consumption by 50 per cent, by 2050.

Another country that has been at the forefront in developing new approaches to public ownership has been Denmark, where a tradition or more decentralised forms of public and collective ownership (including a high preponderance of cooperatives) still shapes much of the approach to economic and social development and has been critical in the growth of its world-renowned renewables sector.

A particularly innovative model of public ownership was used in the construction of what was, at the time of its construction, the world’s largest offshore wind farm; the massive Mittelgrunden complex off the coast of Copenhagen and which provides 40 megawatts of electricity, equivalent to 3 per cent of the capital’s electricity needs. The farm was opened in 2001 after an eight year planning and consultation process. Acceptance of the project by the local population was facilitated by the ownership structure which was divided fifty/fifty between the local utility company, Copenhagen Energy (itself owned by the city council) and a bespoke cooperative, created with the aid of the city council’s energy department and the support of local residents’ groups in which individuals were able to buy shares with over 10,000 residents taking up the option (Soerensen et al 2003). A second public-public partnership model of cooperative-local government utility ownership has also been developed on the island of Samsoe, which has become one of the first places in the world to become 100 per cent efficient in renewable energy.
Developing a publicly owned economy in the twenty first century

What are the lessons to draw from the forms of public ownership that are emerging in the twenty-first century? An important point to make is that there is a wide range of different models of public ownership that can deliver important public policy objectives while still being democratically accountable. There is also a trade-off between delivering very democratic and participatory organisations at the local community level, and having higher national or even international level institutions that can undertake strategic initiatives to deal with broader issues of tackling equality and injustice. Overall, we should aspire towards examples of democratically controlled forms of public ownership that are technically necessary at higher levels whilst relinquishing control of other activities as far as possible to the local level. However, whatever form of ownership is chosen – and it should be recognised that in practice there are many different combinations – the aspiration should be towards democratic decision-making in which employees and user groups have a voice.

The definition of public ownership here is a broad one and includes all those forms of collective ownership that are not either privately owned by individuals or under private ownership as stock exchange registered companies. This is important, for it recognises that public ownership can be delivered either through state forms or outside the state (for example in cooperatives and employee owned corporations). What is important here is that this definition helps to promote broad and diversified collective ownership of the economy that will facilitate greater public engagement and deliberation of economic activities. In other words, the economy becomes more broadly owned and run by the population as a whole, rather than the preserve of concentrated private interests. Delivering on this broad aim, public ownership should have the following aspirations:

- To promote greater participation by workers, consumers and citizens in general economic decision-making;
- To regain the commanding heights of the economy (i.e. take into public ownership industries too strategically important to be left in private hands such as banking, energy, other utilities);
To facilitate greater local community control over resources, especially in the context of increasingly destructive forms of ownership such as private equity firms and other asset-stripping forms of private ownership;

To redistribute income and wealth through cross-subsidisation of different social groups;

To secure key environmental and social goals such as combating climate change and addressing growing inequalities.

Table 2 provides details of six broad types of public ownership that are already present in the contemporary economy: full state ownership (FSO), partial state ownership (PSO), local or municipal ownership (LMO), employee owned firms (EO), producer cooperatives (PO) and consumer cooperatives (CO). As the examples above attest, there are also a range of hybrids that can be adopted as well as more loosely networked forms of organisation that link different localities in providing broader support and resources. The table also provides an assessment of the role of the different forms of public ownership in promoting democratic engagement and fulfilling key public policy goals.

Taking an industry into full state ownership (FSO) – akin to the ‘Morrisonian’\textsuperscript{21} model of nationalisation preferred in the post war period in the UK – will in theory secure the objectives of being able to influence key sectors and undertake longer-term strategic planning to secure important goals, such as dealing with climate change, building and maintaining modern electricity or transport systems, etc. Partial state ownership (PSO) is perhaps the most common form of state ownership in the contemporary economy, largely resulting from partial privatisation processes and is a feature in many European countries. While these forms can be used to secure wider public policy goals or to provide some public influence in different parts of the economy, the trend in recent years – as with many fully owned state companies – has been to allow such firms complete commercial freedom with the state effectively acting as a sleeping partner that benefits from profit and dividends alone.

\textsuperscript{21} Andrew Cumbers - Renewing Public Ownership
FSOs are also less likely to secure greater participation on the part of the ordinary citizen and there is a danger that, over time, they become captured by elite groups and subject to the kinds of principal agent problems that have occurred with earlier nationalisations. This need not necessarily be the case; state owned corporations can have structures and institutional arrangements that give management operational freedom whilst still being more broadly democratically accountable to the wider body politic for setting strategic priorities. Norway’s model of oil nationalisation in the 1970s provides a good example of how this can work in practice (see Box 1).

### Table 2: An evaluation of the effectiveness of different forms of public ownership in achieving desired objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Form of ownership</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securing public control of the economy’s strategic sectors (“commanding heights”)</td>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving greater local community control over decision-making</td>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving distributional justice (equal and fair provision across a national territory)</td>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving environmental sustainability and tackling climate change</td>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing greater participation in decision-making</td>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMO</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CC</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EO</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
+ positive effect
– negative
= neutral
FSO = full state ownership
PSO = partial state ownership
LMO = Local/municipal state ownership
PC = producer cooperative
CC = consumer cooperative
EO = employee ownership
Box 1: Energy policy for the whole of society: Norway’s oil nationalisation in the 1970s

The ‘Norwegian model’ is rightly acclaimed around the world for its approach to North Sea oil and gas development, particularly for dispersing the benefits throughout the country’s economy and society, rather than allowing resources to be captured for vested interests. After almost forty years of oil development, Norway remains one of the most egalitarian societies on the planet, and consistently ranks near the top of the United Nations Human Development Index league table (number one for the most recent rankings in 2011). Much of this progress is due to the basic philosophy behind its energy policy in the 1970s, which insisted that resources be used for “the whole of society” (Ryggvik 2010).

A key plank of oil policy following the discovery of North Sea resources was the establishment of a state-owned oil company, Statoil, to safeguard the nation’s interest against the foreign multinational oil cartel. This involved a top-down model of ownership led initially by elite groups within the central state apparatus. However, over time, as the magnitude of oil resources became apparent, a much more wide-ranging debate over the impact of oil on Norwegian society and culture developed that went beyond narrow economic considerations. In the process, a number of other important mechanisms and institutions were created to secure the national collective interest and broaden public debate over the direction of oil and gas resources. These included the creation of the state’s direct financial interest (SDFI) in 1985. The latter was established because of fears that Statoil was becoming too powerful, the SDFI was valued at 834.8 billion Norwegian krone (NOK) (about £80 billion) in 2008 (NPD 2009). Another point of comparison, marking out Norwegian oil operations from those of the UK, has been the establishment of a state oil fund – known as the ‘Government Pension Fund – Global’ – in 1990, which was worth around £214 billion (Scottish Government 2009).

Two other important institutions were critical. The first was the creation of a Petroleum Directorate as a separate organisational actor to Statoil, independent of the oil companies, that was charged with administering, regulating and controlling oil and gas resources. One of the consequences was the development of the safest offshore oil and gas regime in the world from the early 1980s onwards. But the Directorate also developed its own professional and technical expertise in all matters to do with oil. The second feature was the establishment of what became known as the Paragraph 10 clause in the legislation that created Statoil. While Statoil was always meant to be a commercial operation at arm’s length from government, the clause meant that the company had to present an annual report to parliament on “significant issues relating to principles and policy” (Ryggvik 2010: 100). The effect was that the company, and the broader impact of oil on Norway, was the subject of continuing scrutiny and debate into the 1990s.

Additionally, a whole series of committees in the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) set up their own consultation exercises, including Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Local...
LMOs which are vertically integrated and operate at the scale of city regions or devolved regions, may also score high on these measures whilst having the advantage over FSOs of being more closely connected to local democratic structures. While LMOs are spatially closer to local communities and citizens, they also run the risk of capture by elite groups, particularly at the level of city governance for the development of boosterish projects (e.g. gentrification) that may benefit particular groups over the more general interest. The cooperative and employee-owned firms (EO, PO, CO) clearly score highest in terms of democratic participation and involvement but arguably will do less well at securing broader policy objectives. While an economy composed of decentralised cooperative firms will more than likely shift the overall nature of economic values in an economy towards more socially progressive ends, without countervailing forms of ownership it could also create new hierarchies in providing appropriation rights over revenues to particular groups. Once again there is a compelling Nordic model — this time from Denmark — of how a more decentralised form of public ownership, involving both cooperative but also state involvement at different geographical scales can secure important policy objectives whilst spreading participation and decision-making power to avoid these issues (see Box 2).

All forms of public ownership have their advantages and disadvantages and there will inevitably be trade-offs between the different objectives. If it is assumed that some form of compensation is to be given to existing owners, FPOs are obviously the most expensive and logistically the most difficult to achieve, though not prohibitively...
Box 2: Denmark’s wind power revolution: a lesson in diversified and decentred public ownership

In the field of energy policy, Denmark has been held up as a model by the International Energy Agency for its far-sighted approach to tackling climate change. The country went from being completely dependent on foreign oil and gas for its energy needs in the 1970s to being self-sufficient in energy and generating a new renewable sector accounting for 28 per cent of its electricity needs by 2000. The cornerstone of this success was the emergence of a wind power industry which has not only been at the forefront of Denmark’s strategy to increase self-reliance and reduce CO₂ emission, but has also created 20,000 jobs and given the country’s firms 50 per cent of the world market for wind turbine manufacture (DEA 2010).

Despite the international plaudits, there has been rather less recognition of the policies and institutional mechanisms that have been behind this shift, largely because they fly in the face of much mainstream policy wisdom regarding the reliance on market solutions, and private ownership in particular. Denmark’s wind power revolution has been based upon public ownership and planned interventions that depart markedly from the older bureaucratic versions of nationalisation. In particular, it has combined a national state-led strategy since 1980 to shift towards renewables, with a diversified set of public ownership arrangements operating at different geographical scales (Cumbers 2012, chapter 9). Government subsidies for wind turbine producers combined with policies that forced electricity distribution companies to purchase a certain quota of renewable energy were combined with laws encouraging local and collective ownership of turbines by restricting ownership to those resident in communities where they were built.

The first Danish onshore ‘wind farms’, in the sense of larger-scale activities that supplied more than a local neighbourhood, were all cooperatively owned. At its height in the late 1990s, it was estimated that 150,000 families or around 10 per cent of the population were involved (Cumbers 2012). The participation of communities in the ownership and development of the technology has been a critical factor in the successful growth of renewable energy capacity. Surveys suggest around 70 per cent of the population are in favour of wind farms with only around 5 per cent against (Soerensen et al 2003), figures that are far higher than found elsewhere.

Together, the ‘distance regulation’ laws, state support for renewables, and the localist and collectivist traditions of Danish society have been important in both dispersing economic power and creating the conditions for greater public participation, deliberation and economic democracy in the energy sector. Today the energy system as a whole remains heavily decentralised with around 100 local distribution companies (primarily cooperative and municipally owned) and 10 regional transmission networks (which are amalgamations of the 100 local cooperatives) (DEA 2007). This means that local cooperative and mutual forms of ownership dominate the electricity distribution system.
so, depending upon existing economic conditions and the value of private share capital. By contrast, it is relatively easy to take a partial stake (PPO) or take over one key section of an industry, for example rail track infrastructure or national electricity grids, while still running private services on a contractual basis.

In reality, the form of ownership chosen should vary according to the technical requirement of particular sectors as well as the more strategic and democratic issues discussed above. Table 3 provides an illustrative sketch of how these different forms of public ownership might be applied in practice across the range of economic sectors. The list is far from exhaustive, for example housing and land ownership are not considered, but shows how a very different kind of economy might be built around collective forms of ownership and institution on behalf of the community or ‘general interest’ rather than being dominated and exploited on behalf of elite groups.

Table 3: Schematic depiction of public ownership types by economic activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Spatial organisation</th>
<th>Forms of ownership</th>
<th>Institutional and regulatory arrangements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Finance                   | Local, national and transnational | • global FSOs for international development  
• national FSOs for monetary policies  
• FSOs and LMOs for funding industrial/economic development  
• COs for housing finance  
• PO/EOs for housing, pensions | • tight regulation and demarcation of separate spheres  
• outlawing of speculation and derivatives trading, tax havens  
• restrictions on ‘usury’                                                                 |
| Utility industries (e.g. electricity, water, gas) | Local, national and macro-regional | • combination of LMOs and FSOs | • possibilities for hybrid forms of ownership at local scale (e.g. Denmark) |
| Public transportation     | Local, national and macro-regional | • combination of LMOs and FSOs | • public subsidy for public transport  
• high taxes on private motoring |
| Public services (e.g. health, education) | Local and national | • combination of LMOs and FSOs | • strong national regulatory structure to ensure equal standards between regions  
• high taxation of private forms and redistribution of income to state run areas |
| Consumer products (e.g. clothing, food, electronic equipment) | Global production networks and local or regionalised food networks | • consumer + producer cooperatives  
• small and family owned firms | • ethical trade rules  
• living wage standards  
• rights of collective association  
• tax and other subsidies to stimulate local and carbon-neutral production systems |
Profiteering and speculation in the financial sector have created massive inequities between different social groups over the past three decades without adding to the general common wealth. As is now well recognised, the private and deregulated model precipitated the financial crisis and subsequent recession in the years after 2008. In its place we could develop a very different publicly owned sector. A mix of ownership forms would be consonant with the different needs and uses of money and credit. State ownership, at a range of scales, could be used to secure broader macro-economic objectives, relating to stabilising the economy – in the manner currently undertaken by central banks but requiring the re-democratisation of these institutions away from the ‘independent’ control of financial and economic elites. We should push for much greater political interference in central bank decision-making but this should be of the deliberative kind that involves institutions that opens them up to broader scrutiny. Technical committees and managerial appointees could still be drawn from the economics profession (broadly conceived rather than reduced to the paradigm of mainstream neoclassical economics) but parliament should set its strategic priorities.

National and regional development banks, also under state ownership, could be tasked with investing in key sectors and initiatives, promotion of training and research and development, for example in renewable energy or medical research. Although the Labour Party’s current thinking around the development of national and regional investment banks is an important step in the right direction, such institutions should not be beholden to, or seen as compatible with, private, commercially-driven banks, as seems to be the intention (Tott 2012). Instead, such banks should be driven by a broader public interest requirement, tasked to meet particular social and environmental goals rather than operating on narrow, for which read short-term, profit-making criteria.

The utilities are another example of a set of strategic activities that require management by and for the community as a whole. Many are of course natural monopolies – such as public transport, electricity and water supplies – and also require higher levels of coordination to deliver economies of scale, but these can in some instances be combined with more local and decentralised forms. Water supplies, for example, can be organised effectively at the municipal or regional scales, as is the case with many other European countries. Power generation needs national and even supra-national (e.g. EU) co-ordination of grid networks to deliver
key public policy goals such as tackling climate change and eradicating fuel poverty. However, more localised forms of ownership could be developed for particular aspects of the sector, notably community ownership of renewables schemes.

Public transportation and public services such as health and education should be broadly organised in the public sector but these could take a range of different forms, from local community cooperatives to more national forms (such as educational authorities and basic healthcare) where the demands of distributive justice, efficiency and cross-subsidisation of poorer groups warrant higher scales of organisation. These are sectors where private ownership and market-based forms of delivery should be kept to a minimum because they deal with basic social rights that should not be reduced to a monetary valuation and commodification.

More diverse forms of collective ownership could be given greater encouragement in consumer goods sectors where competitive markets perform the most important function in providing market signals and stimulating innovation. There are plenty of examples of retail chains in Western Europe and Scandinavia that are already cooperatively or employee owned and which provide a high level of service and quality of product (the John Lewis chain in the UK being a prominent example). These could however, be subject to a stricter set of ethical rules around employment conditions, fair trade and environmental best practice.
Conclusions

The aim of this paper has been to argue for new forms of public ownership to address the growing private appropriation of resources, ownership and control in the economy. After over three decades of market deregulation and privatisation and its divisive consequences, we urgently need an alternative and more democratic agenda, which subjects economic policy to greater democratic participation and public debate. As the limitations of market models at delivering social justice and environmental sustainability become daily more evident, the case needs to be made for an economy run by, and for, people, rather than in the interests of a capitalist financial and political elite.

The new and diverse forms of public ownership identified here are central to this mission. They depart significantly from some older forms of public ownership – notably Morrisonian nationalisation – that was rooted in over-centralised and monolithic state entities that were far removed from the ordinary citizen and created new elite groups and concentrations of power. This paper attempts to update and rethink public ownership for the contemporary global economy as a challenge to the increased concentration of economic power within multinational corporations. This will – as our Danish case illustrates – involve a rethink of the relations between geographical scales, providing organisational structures that enhance local democracy but retain the commitment to broader patterns of equity and distributive justice at the national scale.

Drawing upon a range of examples from elsewhere, and in particular the Nordic tradition of common ownership of resources to benefit society as a whole, this paper has argued that alternative forms of public ownership are available that will help to create a more democratic economy. Above all, there is a need to return to forms of ownership that challenge the vested and financial interests that increasingly dominate our lives. Too often this leads to decisions based on short-termism, value extraction, and the appropriation of common resources for private gain. A much longer-term approach to the UK’s economy is required where public resources and assets are owned, managed and distributed for the collective good, and on behalf of present and future generations.
Notes and References

Notes

¹ See National Audit Office 2011
² Reported on BBC News 17th February 2008.
³ Most notably, the Government’s banking reform bill whose main change is to try to create a firewall between retail banking operations and “casino” investment banking, whilst leaving the underlying ownership and structure of the banking sector untouched (HM Treasury 2013).
⁴ See for example Mazzucato 2011.
⁵ See Cumbers 2012 for a lengthier discussion of these issues.
⁶ See Cumbers et al 2013.
⁸ See for example Chang 2009.
⁹ See the excellent recent report by David Parker 2012. In it he calculates that the 860 PFI projects that have been constructed in the UK since 1991 have resulted in £239 billion of liabilities for future generations of taxpayers.
¹⁰ See Cumbers et al 2013 for further details.
¹¹ ibid.
¹² See Cumbers 2012, chapter one
¹³ These owners were given remarkably favourable deals considering the way they had run down their respective industries. The general consensus at the time, even among the Conservatives and business, was that the financial terms of nationalisation were very generous for the former owners. As The Economist put it, following the publication of the terms relating to Bank of England nationalisation: “It would take a very nervous heart to register a flutter at what is contained in the bill. Nothing could be more moderate.”
¹⁴ The most obvious example was France where government nationalisation of the banking system alongside utilities meant a modernisation agenda accompanied by sustained financial investment (Cumbers 2012).
¹⁵ For example, the boards of the newly nationalised electricity and gas companies were composed of four members representing the state, four from technical and expert groups (two to represent the consumer interest), and four from the trade unions (Bliss 1954). See the excellent account by Saville 1993.
¹⁶ See Cumbers et al 2013.
¹⁷ There are a vast number of PUPs operating worldwide that encourage public utilities to share and exchange knowledge and skills.
¹⁸ See for example Chang 2009.

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